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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 260 
Accident time: 08:15 Accident Date: 25/08/1999 
Where it occurred: Plowshare Minefield, 
Cordon Sanitaire 
Country: Zimbabwe 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: KMS 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: M969 AP blast Ground condition: woodland (bush) 
Date record created: 18/02/2004 Date  last modified: 18/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate area marking (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
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Accident report 
At the time of this accident the demining company operated in two-man teams using a one-
man drill. One deminer looked for tripwires, cut undergrowth, used the detector and 
excavated finds while the other watched from a safe distance and "controlled" him. The group 
issued frontal protection and their drills assumed that the deminer would kneel or squat while 
excavating. 
An internal Accident report was made available by the demining group in December 1999. 
The following summarises its content. 
The victim was cutting an exploratory lane "to identify the direction of the Plough share 
mines". This appears to have been done by identifying a picket (post on which the plough 
share mines were originally placed) and working towards the next. The victim missed the next 
picket and returned to a place 30 metres from the last picket. "This is the normal drill to be 
used when row direction is lost". The victim did not use the correct marking and clearance 
procedures. He was investigating a detector reading at 08:15 when the accident occurred. 
The victim suffered severe facial injuries and lacerations to his right hand. He was treated by 
a paramedic and then taken to hospital. The Site Supervisor was confused over which 
hospital the victim was taken to and called the Medevac route "unclear" [from which I infer 
that the route to be taken was not clear in advance]. At 08:55 the Site Supervisor was told 
that the victim was "at hospital receiving treatment". 
The investigators found detector readings in the lane leading to the accident site. No lane 
markings for the last five metres were evident and the vegetation had not been cut. The 
victim's mine detector was found to be operating properly. His visor was on the site and had 
been smeared with blood, but there was no sign of any blast damage to it. From this the 
investigators inferred that it was not worn at the time of the accident. 
They found no sign of excavation around the blast crater. They also found no sign of the 
victim's prodder and trowel, [and so did not determine which was in use at the time]. 
They found no evidence of the mine but decided it was "more than likely" an M969 or a VS50. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was working incorrectly in numerous ways and 
used incorrect "prodding/excavation" methods. They felt that "complacency had set in". They 
found that the immediate treatment and Medevac of the victim was "adequate" (although the 
route was unclear) and stated that radio communications worked well. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended retraining stressing the problems of working in a "patterned 
minefield and complacency". Supervisors were to give refresher training to Team Leaders, 
who (if satisfactory) would pass on the training to deminers. A general personnel 
reassessment was scheduled [partly as the result of a second severe injury occurring on the 
same day]. They further recommended that the Medevac route "be reviewed immediately" 
and the victim and his partner should be dismissed for "gross negligence of SOPs". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 334 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 7 hours 45 minutes 
Protection issued: Frontal apron Protection used: Frontal apron 
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Long visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Eyes 
severe Face 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Finger  
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
An internal "Medical report" was made available in December 1999. This stated that the victim 
reached the field medical unit by 08:30 where he was stabilised and then evacuated to St 
Albert's hospital. He was treated and stabilised there again before being moved to Karanda 
hospital [where the Site supervisor thought he was going directly] at 12:30, arriving at around 
16:00 hours. On arrival he was treated in the "casualty theatre". He had "reconstructive 
surgery to left eye" and "right eye surgery". The following day the victim was transferred to a 
specialist eye unit in the capital city. 
The victim's injuries were described as "bilateral penetrating eye injuries, multiple second 
degree facial burns, traumatic amputation of distal left index finger". The prognosis was that 
the victim would "probably" retain 70% vision in his left eye, while having 0-10% in his right. 
The report included an explanation of the deviation from the usual medevac route – saying 
that immediate examination of the eye in a sterile environment was thought necessary, so the 
route was changed.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim 
was in breach of several basic safety rules and his errors were not corrected. Peer control by 
partners is known to be ineffective and the management's decision to dismiss the victim and 
his partner while not punishing the Team Leader seems strange. The Team Leader was 
retrained along with all other personnel, and it seems likely that the victim's partner could 
have benefited from that as well. Because retraining was accepted as necessary, the 
secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”. 
The management of this demining group's willingness to admit its own failings and attempts 
to address them was unusual, and refreshing. Their open attitude to "mine-hunting", which is 
common but usually denied at senior level, is noteworthy.  
 
3 
